The paper draws on practice from the following countries which receive a significant number of asylum-seekers: the United States of America (US), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK). 13 The specific European States were selected because in 2010 alone, they collectively received three quarters of asylum applications in the European Union (EU). More specifically, they received 70 per cent of all asylum applications by Afghans, 80 per cent of all applications by Iraqis, and 90 per cent of all applications by Somalis in the EU. 14 The paper does not draw on practice from Africa and Latin America because of the application of regional refugee law instruments, with the exception of Costa Rica and Venezuela which exclusively employed the 1951 refugee definition. 15 Given the absence of widespread ratification of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol in Asia, the paper does not analyze State practice from this region either. 13 The paper does not purport to show how each of the examined State interpret each of the elements of the refugee definition. Rather, it concentrates on selected elements of the definition and examines the most insightful State practice in this respect. 14 The same European States were examined by the UNCHR for its analysis of the interpretation and application of Article 15(c) Qualification Directive. See UNHCR, note 12, 8. 15 The analysis of practice in Costa Rica and Venezuela is exclusively based on information provided by UNHCR.
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The examined jurisprudence primarily concerns refugee claimants from the following countries 16 and since 2001, they have also been amongst the main countries of origin of asylum-seekers in the examined receiving States. 17 Although this paper focuses on practice post 11 September 2001, given the caesura that this event marks for asylum law and for the policies of many States, prior significant legal developments are also considered. The paper analyses the 1951 Convention's inclusion clause of Article 1A(2).
It does not examine exclusion from or cessation of refugee status. It does not scrutinize temporary or complementary protection, or the broader refugee definitions at the regional level.
TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS
When determining refugee status in the context of armed conflict and other situations of violence, national decision-makers have used the terms 'fighting between clans engaged in civil war' 18 , 'civil unrest in the form of an armed conflict' 19 , 'internal armed conflict' 20 , 'a tragic situation of war or armed conflict' 21 , 'a very high level of widespread violence' 22 and 'civil war' 23 , to name but a few. The terms used to describe the factual circumstances in a country of origin are crucial because they convey an understanding of the situation and its consequences for the affected persons, and may determine whether to use the 1951 refugee definition, broader refugee definitions, or complementary protection. 24 Examining a situation of clan-based fighting in Somalia, Lord Lloyd found in Adan that the drafters of the 1951 Convention did not consider situations of civil war when they settled on 16 Where significant legal developments relate to other countries of origin, they were nonetheless considered. The paper does not focus on gang-related violence. See 25 In Haji Ibrahim, Judge Gummow, referring to Adan's classification of the situation in Somalia as a civil war, had argued that the 'widespread disorder' in Somalia cannot be considered a civil war without 'a risk that there will be a blurring of the distinction between the persecutory acts which the asylum-seeker must show and the broader circumstances to those acts.' 26 Judge Gummow further observed that '[t]he notions of "civil war", "differential operation" and "object" or "motivation" of that "civil war" are distractions from applying the text of the Convention definition.' 27 Thus, the way in which a situation in a country of origin is framed may affect the interpretation of the 1951 refugee definition and may even mislead decision-makers. It is therefore advisable to use non-judgmental terms when referring to a situation of conflict and violence in a country of origin.
The frequent juxtaposition between 'generalized violence' and a well-founded fear of persecution for a 1951 Convention ground is also a manifestation of this problem. 28 The term 'generalized violence' seems to have its origins in the broader refugee definition of the Cartagena Declaration. 29 Both the terms 'generalized violence' and 'indiscriminate violence' connote that violence is untargeted, widespread, random, and affects all alike and in turn suggests that people fleeing from such violence are not refugees under the 1951 Convention. However, these concepts may fall short of a careful analysis warranted by the complex situation in the country of origin. 30 In fact, violence can be widespread and targeted 31 and a large number of people can be affected by violence for a 1951 Convention ground; for instance in a conflict fought along sectarian lines. This is why this paper will employ the broad terms 'conflict' and 'violence' rather than 'generalized violence'. 25 It is important to examine the relevance of the term 'armed conflict' as used in international humanitarian law (IHL). The application of IHL is predicated on the existence of an international or non-international armed conflict. Amongst the many definitions of non-international armed conflict offered in the jurisprudence and literature, 32 the definition given by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia stands out the most: a non-international armed conflict exists 'whenever there is (…) protracted armed violence between government authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.' 33 It focuses on the type of violence, its duration and the degree of organization of the parties to the conflict. While these insights are helpful for the understanding of 'conflict' and 'violence', it is important to acknowledge that the definitions of international and non-international armed conflict developed under IHL are intended to delineate the material scope of IHL. The scope of the present paper is not limited to such armed conflicts. 34 Guidance is also found in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on non-refoulement contained in the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). On several occasions, the ECtHR addressed situations of expulsion to countries experiencing conflict and violence.
For instance, in Vilvarajah v. the United Kingdom, while referring to the situation in Sri Lanka as a 'civil disturbance' 35 , the ECtHR had observed that 'occasional fighting still took place in the north and east of Sri Lanka between units of IPKF [Indian Peace Keeping Forces] and Tamil militants (…) In these areas there was a persistent threat of violence and a risk that civilians might become caught up in the fighting'. 36 The Court concluded that there were no substantial grounds for finding that the applicants would face a real risk of being subjected to violations of Article 3 ECHR upon return to Sri Lanka. 37 Additionally, in NA v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR stated that it 'has never excluded the possibility that a general situation of violence in a country of destination will be of a sufficient level of intensity as to entail that any removal to it would necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention (…) only in the most extreme cases of general violence.' 38 Yet in the landmark case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom in 2011, the ECtHR had considered for the very first time, that a situation of violence, in this case in Mogadishu entailed such a level of intensity to pose a real risk for everyone in Mogadishu of treatment 7 reaching the Article 3 threshold. 39 This jurisprudence demonstrates that violence is a means by which a conflict is brought to bear which may vary in terms of duration, geographic scope and intensity.
Further insights may be obtained from research projects that empirically examine and classify situations in numerous countries. Different projects employ different concepts. 40 For example, the definitions of conflict and violence used by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict
Research are thoroughly comprehensive. They define conflict as 'the clashing of interests (positional differences) over national values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, States, groups of States, organizations) that are determined to pursue their interests and achieve their goals' 41 , distinguishing between different types of conflict according to the intensity of the violence used. 42 A general classification of a situation in a country of origin might distort the interpretation and application of the 1951 refugee definition by incorrectly insinuating a certain level, type, impact or scope of the conflict or violence. Such a classification ought not to be relevant for the interpretation of the 1951 refugee definition. For the purpose of applying the 1951 refugee definition, it is important to describe the situation in the country of origin in clear and nonjudgmental terms, and to understand it in its proper context. 42 It employs a sliding scale of intensity from latent conflict over manifest conflict and crisis to severe crisis and war. See Ibid. 8 The first group of refugees addressed by the League of Nations were Russians fleeing the civil war, the Bolshevik Revolution and the famine. 43 The loss of protection from their country of origin prompted their need for international protection, 44 with the League of Nations regularizing their status in 1922. 45 The fact of having fled from armed conflict or other situations of violence was irrelevant for refugee status under this arrangement as well as under the 1924 extension to Armenian refugees. 46 However, subsequent arrangements did include two definitional criteria such that refugees must: lack protection from the State of origin and be of a specific ethnic or territorial origin. 47 While having fled from a situation of conflict and violence was not a legally relevant criterion for refugee status it did not rule out a finding of refugee status either.
II THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW IN LIGHT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OTHER SITUATIONS OF VIOLENCE
In 1926, the League of Nations Council discussed the expansion of existing arrangements for the protection of refugees in analogous situations. 48 Three criteria were used in identifying additional refugee groups: (1) de jure lack of protection by the country of origin; (2) flight from events connected to the First World War; and (3) territorial or ethnic origin. 49 The extension of refugee protection was thus meant to include people who fled from conflict and violence in the context of the First World War when protection by the country of origin was absent. Other refugee instruments adopted during this time do not shed any further light on the definition of who is a refugee in the context of armed conflict and other situations of violence. In the inter-war period, the fact of having fled from conflict or violence did not pre-empt a finding of refugee status. In some cases it was even decisive in bringing groups of people within the mandate of the League of Nations. The crucial legal criterions -lack of protection by the country of origin -applied irrespective of whether a country was experiencing situations of conflict and violence.
The forced displacement of at least 40 million people as a result of the Second World War, 50 together with subsequent further displacement, provided the impetus for the establishment of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO), as well as UNHCR and the adoption of the 1951 Convention.
Established in 1946, 51 the IRO's Constitution alludes to the Second World War in defining several, but not all, categories of refugees and displaced persons. 52 There were certain conditions under which distinct individuals would become of concern to the IRO. 53 'Persecution, or fear, based on reasonable grounds of persecution because of race, religion, nationality or political opinions' 54 was such a condition. Thus, a situation of conflict or violence in the country of origin was not a decisive criterion for opposing return. 55 Yet such a situation did not preclude a person from coming within the personal scope of the IRO mandate either.
After the dissolution of the IRO, 56 58 UNHCR's competence ratione personae has since evolved to cover people fleeing from 'serious (including indiscriminate) threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting from generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order'. 59 The drafters of the 1951 Convention generally understood the substance of the refugee definition to be broad and applicable to almost all known categories or groups of refugees. 60 Rather than being substantially influenced by the Cold War, they developed the refugee definition against the backdrop of thirty years of experience with refugees. 61 Originally, the refugee definition was temporarily and geographically limited because the negotiating States hesitated to commit to protecting an unforeseeable population of future refugees, with the US representative arguing, for example, that '[t]oo vague a definition, which would amount (…) to a blank check, would not be sufficient.' 62 The drafters were thus concerned with limiting the personal scope of the 1951 Convention.
The Israeli representative observed that the refugee definition obviously did not refer to refugees from natural disasters, for it was difficult to imagine that fires, floods, earthquakes or volcanic eruptions, for instance, differentiated between their victims on the grounds of race, religion, or political opinion. Nor did the text cover all man-made events. There was no provision, for example, for refugees fleeing from hostilities unless they were otherwise covered by article 1 of the Convention. 63 The key element of this statement is the differentiation required for victims of hostilities to be The statement of the Israeli delegate indicates that the drafters of the 1951 Convention's definition did not intend for its scope ratione personae to cover persons who 'merely' fled from political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country'. 59 has to prove the risk and (2) how individualized must the risk be?
The burden of proof in most States rests on the refugee claimant 77 , while UNHCR argues that the obligation to ascertain and analyse all relevant facts is shared by the applicant and the decision- individuals.' 90 In other words, the experiences of similarly situated persons can support a claim of being at risk of persecution. In the US, for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal expressly acknowledged that the group of persons subjected to the same risk as the applicant is not limited in terms of size or categorization. 91 The jurisprudence in Australia and New Zealand also rejects the differential risk requirement. 92 In Haji Ibrahim, Judge McHugh of the Australian High Court considered: I see no basis in the text of the Convention or otherwise for holding that, in conditions of civil war or unrest, a person can prove persecution only when he or she can establish a risk of harm over and above that of others caught up in those conditions. (…) It is not the degree or differentiation of risk that determines whether a person caught in a civil war is a refugee under the Convention definition. It is a complex of factors that is determinative -the motivation of the oppressor; the degree and repetition of harm to the rights, interests or dignity of the individual; the justification, if any, for the infliction of that harm and the proportionality of the means used to achieve the justification. 93 In New Zealand, the Refugee Status Appeals Authority (RSSA) rejected the proposition that an armed conflict or a situation of violence warrants a higher level of risk than a situation of peace.
It held that 'the claimant must only establish the "ordinary" real chance of being persecuted and not some increased level of risk or that he/she has been singled out for persecution'. 94 In other cases, it deduced from the general level and targeted nature of violence in North Iraq that Christians face a real chance of being persecuted. 95 In UNHCR's view, the refugee definition does not require a differential risk or impact. It also does not require that a refugee claimant show that he or she would be singled out or individually targeted. In noting that the size of the affected group is irrelevant, UNHCR has stated that: 'Whole communities may risk or suffer persecution for Convention reasons. that all members of the community are equally affected does not in any way undermine the legitimacy of any particular individual claim.' 96 The underlying rationale of requiring a higher level of risk may well be found in the political realm rather than in the legal sphere. Concerns have been voiced that unless a higher level of risk is required, individuals on either side of a conflict could qualify for refugee protection, 97 thus potentially leading to large numbers of refugee claimants. Moreover, the differential risk requirement in British jurisprudence seems rooted in preconceptions based on the classification of the situation in the country of origin: where a civil war devolves into a situation of general lawlessness, a refugee claimant would have to meet additional requirements in terms of the level of risk. 98 There is nothing in the wording of the 1951 refugee definition to suggest that a refugee has to be singled out for persecution, either generally or over and above other persecuted persons. Requiring otherwise ignores the potentially evidentiary value of the experiences of similarly situated people, and goes against the object and purpose of the 1951 Convention, as the result would be to deny refugee protection in situations when a large number of people would require it.
PERSECUTION
Whether or not conduct constitutes persecution must be determined in light of all the circumstances, taking into consideration the individual's profile, experiences, activities, age and gender. 99 An act can constitute persecution irrespective of whether it occurs during peacetime, armed conflict or other situations of violence. This is the view of Australian, German and US Criteria used by a number of States to determine whether a form of harm constitutes persecution in the context of armed conflict and situations of violence include repetition, repeatability, duration, and severity of the infringement. 105 It is important to take into account the cumulative effect of harmful acts, as the example of the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit shows.
The Court held that having been detained three times by a Colombian guerrilla group for short periods of time did not amount to persecution, whilst an eight-day abduction did. 106 The Court failed to consider the cumulative effects of these incidents, which can be particularly severe in armed conflict and other situations of violence. As UNHCR stresses: 'Regular exposure to measures such as security checks, raids, interrogation, personal and property searches, and restrictions on freedom of movement may, in some cases, result in undue hardship for the persons affected and cumulatively amount to persecution.' 107
Persecution and Conduct under International Humanitarian Law
IHL is the branch of international law specifically designed for situations of armed conflict. 118 Council of the European Union, note 7, para. 6.
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International refugee law, international criminal law and international human rights law are interconnected, in particular as regards the prohibition on arbitrary displacement, as the expert meeting convened by UNHCR and the ICTR emphasized. The meeting also noted that although international refugee law and international criminal law consider many of the same acts as amounting to persecution and have resorted to human rights as an interpretative aid, differences remain between the respective concepts. 119 The complementarities and differences of these bodies of international law must be taken into account in the interpretation of persecution.
Persecution and the Restoration or Maintenance of Law and Order
Within armed conflict and situations of violence, measures taken to restore or maintain law and order can raise questions of determining whether or not they are persecutory. The two specific issues at play are whether the measures were undertaken for a legitimate purpose, and second, whether the measures were proportionate to the pursuit of that objective.
Some These 'conflict-sensitive' approaches to the nexus requirement contrast with other approaches to this issue. Dutch jurisprudence rarely examines the nexus requirement in detail and usually does not specify the 1951 Convention ground. 133 The Australian High Court rejected the proposition that a decision-maker would be required, in a case involving a situation of armed conflict, to determine whether the objective of a war is directed against persons because of a 1951
Convention ground. 134 One must not confuse equality of risk of harm with the equality of reason for that harm.
The well-foundedness element (ie, the risk issue) is a separate inquiry to that of the "for reason of" element (ie, the nexus issue). So while it is convenient to speak in the shorthand of a differential risk in order to emphasize the specific focus of the "for reason of" element, the very phrasing of the short-hand expression can, unfortunately, lead to a conflation of the risk element with the "for reason of" or nexus requirement. If this happens, a person at real risk of serious harm for reason of his or her religion will be required to establish that he or she is more at risk of serious harm for reason of his or her religion than others who are equally at real risk of serious harm for reason of their religion. This is a requirement to establish a double-differential risk. Such approach, we believe, amounts to a misdirection in law. 142 In some US jurisprudence, the nexus requirement in its entirety is equated with the necessity that the refugee claimant be singled out for a 1951 Convention ground. For example, in Trujillo Jabba and others, the Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit found that the applicants 'failed to show that, upon return to Colombia, they will be "singled out" for persecution on account of a Moreover, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the petitioner 'must establish that he is at particular risk as a Christian and that his predicament is appreciably different from the dangers faced by other non-Christian Iraqis'. 146 However, the fact that the petitioner's predicament is linked to his or her religion will also suffice in order to fulfil the nexus requirement. The predicament of other groups in Iraq is irrelevant for the interpretation of the nexus requirement. Otherwise, refugee claimants from countries in which various groups are being persecuted would be disadvantaged. Such a comparative approach would result in a more stringent interpretation of the nexus requirement in the context of armed conflict and other situations of violence than in times of peace. 147 As already stated, there is nothing in the wording of the refugee definition that supports the proposition that in the context of armed conflict and other situations of violence, a refugee claimant must be singled out for persecution for a 1951 Convention ground. Rather, the 1951
Convention grounds refer to characteristics or beliefs typically shared by groups of people. 148 An understanding that there is no nexus to a 1951 Convention ground where a large number of people face persecution would thus go against the object and purpose of the 1951 Convention. 149 The requirement of individually experienced persecution does not mean that a person has been or will be persecuted because of his or her individual activities as opposed to his or her membership of a persecuted group. Being part of a persecuted group should be individual enough. 150 persecution putting all members of the targeted group in danger. As a result, the individual applicant does not have to show that he or she is individually targeted but only that he or she is a member of the targeted group. Being personally at risk of persecution should merely mean that the person is purposefully, rather than accidentally, at risk of being harmed. 152 For a finding of a nexus to a 1951 Convention ground, UNHCR notes that it is not necessary that the asylum-seeker be known to, and sought or targeted personally, by the persecutor(s). 153 In light of the above, the non-comparative approach to the nexus requirement, enunciated by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, is to be preferred in the context of armed conflict and other situations of violence:
[A] situation of civil war in a given country is not an obstacle to a claim provided the fear felt is not that felt indiscriminately by all citizens as a consequence of the civil war, but that felt by the applicant himself, by a group with which he is associated, or, even, by all citizens on account of a risk of persecution based on one of the reasons stated in the definition. 154 
THE 1951 CONVENTION GROUNDS
Armed conflicts and other situations of violence are often rooted in political, ethnic or religious differences with different groups facing heightened risks of harm, 155 
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The 1951 Convention grounds of race and nationality are closely intertwined; they both encompass ethnicity. Race is to be understood broadly so as to include ethnic groups and persons of common descent usually constituting a minority within a given population. 159 Nationality must also be given a broad interpretation and includes membership of a group determined by cultural, ethnic or linguistic identity. 160 Examples of cases that concern persecution for the sole reason of ethnicity relate to the Hazara in Afghanistan, 161 the Tamils in Sri Lanka 162 and minority clans in southern and central Somalia. 163 Refugee claims concerning solely the 1951 Convention ground of race are rare partly because many racial or ethnic claims to refugee status are framed and decided on other grounds such as particular social group or political opinion. Ethnic groups are often associated with movements seeking power, equality or independence, and thus refugee claims of members of such groups are also considered under the ground of political opinion. 164 The UNHCR Handbook notes:
The co-existence within the boundaries of a State of two or more national (ethnic, linguistic) groups may create situations of conflict and also situations of persecution or danger of persecution. It may not always be easy to distinguish between persecution for reasons of nationality and persecution for reasons of political opinion when a conflict between national groups is combined with political movements, particularly where a political movement is identified with a specific 'nationality'. 165 This position has been affirmed by guidance for refugee status decision-makers adopted in the UK 166 and the US. 167 For example, in the context of the armed conflict in Sri Lanka, a number of claims by Tamil asylum-seekers have been found to have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of their ethnicity and their imputed political opinion. 168 In a context of armed conflict and other situations of violence, a refugee claimant may be at risk of being persecuted for reasons of their ethnicity although they themselves are not directly involved in the conflict. Based on their ethnicity, the agent of persecution may identify them with a group involved in the conflict. 169 Affiliation or perceived affiliation with a State that is supporting an armed group may also give rise to a fear of persecution based on nationality. For example, the UK AIT found that nationality or perceived nationality of a State regarded as hostile to the DRC, in particular individuals perceived to have Rwandan connections or to be of Rwandan origin, constituted a risk category. 170 conflict, the question of whether they would be at risk of being persecuted for reasons of their The 1951 Convention ground of religion is also relevant, as many conflicts are fought along sectarian lines. Race and nationality also often overlap the ground of religion. Broadly construed, religion refers to a belief or non-belief, an identity and/or a way of life. 173 For example, in cases concerning Christians in Iraq, a well-founded fear of being persecuted has often been found to be for reasons of religion. 174 In armed conflicts and other situations of violence involving groups with different religious identities, such groups usually pursue a political agenda and the corresponding political opinions may be imputed to members of such groups. 175 In Iraq, violence against Christians in some cases has been informed by their perceived association with the occupying forces, thus giving rise to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of religion and imputed political opinion. 176 Moreover, non-State actors may impose religious norms in the area that they control, perceiving deviation from such norms as manifesting religious (non-)belief and/or a political opinion. 177 
Membership of a particular social group
Apart from the widely acknowledged political, ethnic and religious dimensions of many modern conflicts, discussed above, a specific area that is under-explored is the application of the ground of membership of a particular social group, in particular as regards civilians and groups pursuing a certain profession. For the purpose of the refugee definition, it is generally agreed that a group does not have to be homogeneous or internally coherent in order to constitute a particular social group; 178 the size of the group is thus irrelevant. 179 For the existence of a particular social group, it is also not necessary to establish that all members of that particular social group are at risk 180 and neither should the group be exclusively defined by a shared fear of being persecuted. 181 them and enables them to be set apart from society at large.' 184 UNHCR's definition of particular social group reconciles both approaches in a non-cumulative way. 185 
Civilians
In the context of armed conflicts, in which civilians are often directly targeted and bear the brunt of hostilities, the question arises whether civilians can constitute a particular social group for the purposes of the 1951 refugee definition. No State practice has been identified that addresses this question specifically. In Canada, while its Civil War Guidelines refer to 'civilian non-combatants fearing persecution in civil war situations', 186 they do not discuss this issue directly.
As a term of art in IHL, the term 'civilians' only comes to bear in situations of armed conflict as opposed to internal disturbances or riots. Customary IHL defines 'civilian' as a person who is not a member of the armed forces. It remains unsettled in customary IHL whether, in situations of internal armed conflicts, members of armed opposition groups are considered as members of armed forces or as civilians. 187 The group comprising of civilians, in a country that is experiencing an armed conflict, is potentially large and heterogeneous but not all civilians are necessarily at risk during situations of armed conflict. As discussed above, this does not mean that civilians cannot constitute a particular social group. Under the protected characteristics approach, it must be examined whether civilians share a common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted which is innate, unchangeable, or so fundamental to their identity, conscience or exercise of human rights that they cannot be required to change it.
A civilian is a person who is not a member of the armed forces, a characteristic that could change. Some individuals who object to recruitment into the armed forces of a State or into armed groups or individuals who desert might fall into a narrower social group than 'civilians' and the notion of 'civilian' would not necessarily be relevant for the group's definition. Under the protected characteristics approach, it seems that civilians would therefore not constitute a particular social group.
According to the social perceptions approach, in order for civilians to constitute a social group, they need to be perceived as such by society. Civilians are negatively defined as people who are 32 not members of the armed forces. In Belgium, the armed forces have been considered to constitute a particular social group clearly distinguished from the rest of society because they have an exclusive and specific function, their own set of rules and way of life, and confer upon their members a particular social status, demonstrated by wearing uniforms and living in barracks. 188 This begs the question of whether 'the rest of society', i.e. civilians, would conversely constitute a different particular social group. This seems difficult to establish, given that a social group must be distinguished from the relevant society at large. For civilians to be perceived as a social group, the society in question would appear to have to be highly militarized, with a fairly prevalent membership in the armed forces so as to make the lack of such membership objectively cognisable. 189 In the context of non-international armed conflict, where at least one party to such an armed conflict is an armed opposition group 190 , the status of its members can be difficult to determineas a matter of law as well as in reality. If its members are considered to be civilians, they would nonetheless lose the protection afforded to civilians for the period of time in which they participate in the hostilities. 191 It would, therefore, be impossible for society to perceive civilians as a particular social group because this group would comprise both members of armed opposition groups involved in the hostilities and of civilians who are not or who have never taken part in the hostilities. However, if members of armed opposition groups are considered to be 'functional combatants' 192 rather than civilians, then it is more likely that civilians can be perceived as a distinct social group.
It is hence conceivable that civilians in a particular context could constitute a particular social group pursuant to the social perceptions approach. This would depend on the precise constellations of the armed conflict and the circumstances in the country of origin. At the same 33 time, it is likely that the group would have to be defined by more criteria than simply 'civilian'
for it to constitute a particular social group in the sense of the 1951 refugee definition. profession was, therefore, determined not to be an immutable characteristic. 198 The Court of Appeal for England and Wales held in a case in which the appellant was a landowner who faced extortion from a guerrilla group that 'rich land-owners in Colombia' do not constitute a particular social group because they do not share an immutable characteristic. 199 In addition,
Canadian jurisprudence also considers that businessmen or -women do not constitute a particular social group. 200 In contrast, the US Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit has held that a profession can be a distinguishing feature within a given society that cannot easily be changed or hidden. This court identified that a particular social group is not determined by profession alone, but also by ownership of land, social position, and education. 201 The notion of political opinion is context-specific; it must 'reflect the reality of the geographical, historical, political, legal, judicial and socio-cultural context of the country of origin'. 206 In UNHCR's view, political opinion includes 'any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of the State, government, society, or policy may be engaged.' 207 Cases concerning refusals to join or support a party to a conflict or to take sides may relate to expressions of political neutrality, which has been considered a political opinion in certain circumstances. 208 Acts which might at first sight appear to be solely private may also have a political dimension. For examples, rebels may compel women and girls to provide shelter and food or to act as messengers, taking advantage of the fact that they are less likely to be perceived as members of a rebel group. 209 A person with a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of political opinion need not expressly articulate such opinion. Political opinion may be attributed to the victim by the persecutor; it is irrelevant whether this opinion actually corresponds to the victim's views. 210 In such cases, it is the persecutor's perception of the victim's political opinion that is relevant rather than the persecutor's own political opinions. 211 Non-State actors may also impute political opinions to their victims. 212 Political opinion is to be interpreted broadly, 213 but not so broadly that it encompasses any opinion which a non-State agent of persecution may impute on its victim. 214 Whether an opinion 36 imputed by a non-State persecutor on its victims is political depends at least in part on the context and particular features of the conflict and the characteristics of the non-State actor in question. In Colombia, the highly polarized situation 215 In another cases concerning Colombia, the RSAA held:
[T]he FARC is an extreme left-wing political movement which categorizes its victims as enemies of the working class. Its actions are confused, often contradictory and usually criminal, but the underlying political current is sufficient to satisfy the Authority that any harm to the appellant would be for reasons, at least in part, of political opinion. 222 This case illustrates that claims involving imputed political opinion frequently require a careful assessment of the political goals of a non-State party to a conflict and their connection, if any, with individual attacks by members of this party against specific persons. It may be difficult to ascertain whether a non-State party to a conflict seeks to achieve its political goals without regard to the political views of those harmed or whether it attributes a political opinion to them. 223 Moreover, economic or criminal motives may also be involved; though as stated above, such multiple motives do not negate a finding of a nexus to the 1951 Convention ground of political opinion. 224 As regards political opinion, the challenge is to take into account the political dimension of a conflict and its impact on the individual refugee claimant. The general objectives of the agent of persecution alone do not suffice to demonstrate imputed political opinion. 225 In the UK Border Agency's view, ' [e]ven if a rebel group has a broad political aim (e.g.
overthrowing the Government), individual attacks on particular individuals might simply be retaliatory or criminal and not necessarily linked to an overriding political aim.' 226 Whilst it is true that not every act of such a group is related to its political objectives, retaliation may be criminal or political and warrants a careful analysis of the circumstances of the case. 227 Thus, in cases concerning non-State actors, the assessment of whether the opinion attributed to the refugee claimant is a political one requires a careful analysis of the characteristics of the nonState actor, its political objectives, if any, and how they relate to individual acts that affect the victim, the broader context of the conflict, and the individual circumstances of the claimant.
The jurisprudence provides some guidance regarding the bases on which a political opinion may be attributed to an individual in contexts of armed conflict and other situations of violence. Moreover, the availability of State protection in the proposed area of relocation forms part of the analysis of whether this area is relevant. The UNHCR Handbook notes that 'a state of war, civil war or other grave disturbance' may prevent a country from granting protection or may render such protection ineffective. 244 For the Canadian IRB, the intensity of a conflict and the volume of threats to citizens may indicate a State's inability to provide protection to the claimant. 245 In 40 Germany, 246 Canada 247 and the US, 248 territorial control has been considered a crucial factor in assessing the ability of the country of origin to provide protection. Although UNHCR has understood territorial control as a prerequisite for effective State protection, 249 it also noted that during situations of conflict and violence, State protection may be ineffective despite the State's territorial control over an area. 250 Territorial control is thus a necessary but not sufficient factor in determining the availability of State protection in a proposed area of relocation.
Canadian jurisprudence presumes State protection except in situations of complete breakdown of the State apparatus. 251 Other relevant factors in assessing whether a proposed area of relocation is relevant concern the reach of non-State agents of persecution and the extent to which they exercise territorial control over an area. When examining the existence of an IFA for a Somali claimant, the UK AIT held:
'Amongst the relevant general circumstances will be to what extent there are parts of central or southern Somalia which an applicant can access where there is not the prevalence of ongoing fighting (because for example one side has established or re-established territorial control).' 252 Yet, such territorial control must not be the sole relevant factor, as the most serious IHL violations are often committed in situations where one side has gained the upper hand. 253 Conversely, lack of territorial control by the non-State agent of persecution over the proposed area of relocation does not suffice to establish that the refugee claimant would be safe. Canadian 41 jurisprudence shows that the lack of territorial control by a non-State agent of persecution in other parts of the country does not necessarily eliminate the risk of harm emanating from this agent. For example, the IRB found that although a guerrilla group was not physically present throughout all of Colombia, it was capable of locating targeted individuals anywhere in the country. 254 The UK Boarder Agency also notes that ' Uganda rather than fleeing to a different region within the DRC. 256 A proposed area of relocation would need to be reasonable in all the circumstances. In particular, the impact of insecurity and the volatility of the conflict, which might render previously secure places unsafe, need to be considered. As UNHCR notes:
In most cases, countries in the grip of armed conflict would not be safe for relocation, especially in light of shifting armed fronts which could suddenly bring insecurity to an area hitherto considered safe. In situations where the proposed internal flight or relocation alternative is under the control of an armed group and/or State-like entity, careful examination must be made of the durability of the situation there and the ability of the controlling entity to provide protection and stability. 257 In some State practice, the security implications of conflict and violence form part of the IFA analysis. According to US regulations, in assessing the reasonableness of a proposed internal protection alternative, the existence of an ongoing civil strife is to be considered. 258 The lack of adequate security is a primary reason why France's National Court of Asylum (Cour Nationale du Droit d'Asile) has often rejected the existence of an IFA. 259 German courts have also found that the proposed area of internal protection must lie outside the territory of the internal armed conflict. 260 The existence of a situation of conflict and violence in the country of origin should not mean that the viability of a proposed IFA is only assessed in terms of safety risks. When determining the existence of an IFA in Colombia, the IRB adopted a comprehensive approach by finding that relevant factors include 'the highly fluid and volatile nature of the conflict, the destruction of socio-economic infrastructure and widespread internal displacement'. 261 Not only did it look at the prevalence of violence, but it also considered the after-effects of conflict and violence. With regard to Sri Lanka, UNHCR also suggested a comprehensive approach to the reasonable analysis: 'the lack of basic infrastructure and inadequacy of essential services (…); the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance; as well as continued economic and security restrictions 
